cia had been assaulted by mobs distressed by severe economic hardship and fearful of a rumored Nasrid offensive with an attendant Mudejar rising (4).
In thís paper we will discuss how conflicts with specific Muslim foes affected Fernando's perception of and policy toward his Muslim subjects in the kingdom of Valencia, and how the Mudejars themselves responded to the intensification of the perennial confrontation between Christianity and Islam.
Of the Islamic powers which Fernando had to face, the expanding empire of the Ottoman Turks posed the greatest threat. The danger peaked in August, 1480, when the torces of Mehmet the Conqueror captured Otranto on the Italian mainland, possibly as a prelude to the conquest of Sicily, an Aragonese possession, and of Rome itself. The crisis passed when the death of Mehmet compelled a Turkish withdrawal from Otranto in September, 1481.
During these critical months, Spain's ascendancy over Islam in the west suddenly seemed precarious. Turkish advances rendered the sultanate of Granada more formidable and the allegiance of Fernando's Muslim subjects more uncertain. Fernando was anxious about the possibility of a Mudejar reaction in Valencia to Ottoman successes. In December, 1480, he reminded his officials of the Turks' entry into Italy and then, noting Valencia's proximity to Granada, fretted over the fact that his kingdom had such a large number of Muslim inhabitants who were well armed and had access to its castles. Having had to postpone the crusade against Granada to counter the Turkish menace, Fernando determined at least to neutralize the Mudejars, lest they should «...make some effort in our disservice and of our Lord God and in damage of that kingdom». He ordered that all Muslims in the kingdom be disarmed and denied access to or custodianship of castles, so that «...we may be without any fear of the said Moors (5)».
However, Fernando added that his officials should act as they deemed best, with out causing any «...inconvenience orscandal (6)». In effect, this meant that they could do very little. Although arms control could be exercised in royal cities and towns (7), seigneurial opposition made it unfeasible in the baronies where the m'ajority of Muslims resided (8). Indeed, documents from 1487 and 1502 describe the Mudejars as still armed to the teeth (9). Lacking evidence of Mudejar activity suggesting insurrec- (41 GUAL, .'Mudejares», , givesan accountof the attackand notes that, a few days after, thecry «moros venen!» sent armed men scrambling to the city's walls. JOSÉ HINOJOSA MONTALVO, «Las relaciones entre los reinos de Valencia y Granada durante la primera mitad del siglo XV», in Estudios de Historia de Valencia (Valencia, 19781, pp. 101-103 , sees the assault on Valencia's morería in 1455 as resulting from the fear of a rumored Nasrid offensive, and notes that the jurats of Valencia described the Mudejars as «nostres enemichs publichs».
[51 ACÁ: C 3605. 87r (13 December, 1480): «...no ignoran la entrada del Turch en la Italia per la qual cosa ab diligencia e gran sollioitud se deíveln entendre en fer los provisons degudes per forma que en nostres regnes e terres per negligentia e no cura se seguís algún ¡nconvenient e perqué vosaltres no ignoran aquex nostre Regne de Valencia quanta vícinitat te al Granada y quant gran nombre de moros hi habiten los quals segons soms informáis teñen moltes armes e teñen entrada y participi en alguns castells e fortalezes. E porias sdevenir que ab aqüestes novitats del Turch fessen qualque assaig en deservey de nostre Senyor Deu e nostre e dan de aqueix Regne. Per go... havem deliberat que vosaltres pensen per quina via mrllor o pus tanta e cómoda sense inconvenient o scandel algu se poran levar totes les armes ais mors habitants en aqueix Regne axi en ciutats viles e fochs nostres com de barons e de ecclesiastichs. E que sia prohibit ais dits moros entrar en fortalezes... E si alguns moros teñen alcaydies de alguns castells que sia provehit que aquells los sien llevades per forma que sense recel algu deis dits moros puixam star...».
(6) ACÁ: C 3605: 87r.
(71 ARV : B 1156 : 874r-v (12 October, 1480 ), and ARV: B 1157 : 265v-266r (27 June, 1482 , are examples of licenses for bearing arms granted to Muslims. ARV: B i 160: 270r (16 August, 1491): the justice of Onda confíscales Muslim's arms.
(8) AMV: gtlon, royal officials kept only a cautlous eye on the Moors without unnecessarily upsetting them by the applícation of a firm hand.
The Turks contlnued to preoccupy Fernando throughout the 1480s, and, so long as Islam was politically alive ¡n Granada, the Mudejars remalned a related, though by no means constant, concern. In 1487 Fernando received disturbing information that the Mudejars had dlspatched two envoys to «the Turk», Bayezit II, to ¡nform hlm of Spain's war against Granada and to request support for the Nasrids before all was lost. The envoys had suggested that Bayezit send his soldlers to Valencia, and there, as ¡n the other Spanish klngdoms, 200,000 Muslims would rise up ¡n their favor and bring about the «...damage-and destruction of the Christians». The king's reaction was restrained. He ordered only a discreet investigation of the rumors. There survive neither responses to Fernando's queries ñor record of the punishment of Mudejar subversives (10).
The rumors seem ridiculous. Certainly, with his hands full in the east and ¡n Egypt, Bayezit was not in any position to mount an invasión of Spain and thereby lend substance to Mudejar plans. Nevertheless, this does not exonérate the Mudejars of the intention of rebellion under propitious circumstances. It is very much within the realm of possibility that Mudejar-Ottoman contact had, in fact, been established.
By 1487 Nasrid poetic appeals for assistance reached both Ottoman and Mamluk courts. Bayezit responded by sendlng the privateer Kemal Reís to the western Mediterranean on a reconaissance mission. Reis based himself as a corsair in Bougie and Bóne and is thought to have made contact with Granadan Muslims somewhere along Spain's southeastern coast. The cióse ties between Valencian and Granadan Muslims, the great concern for Granada expressed in the Mudejars' alleged embassy"and the embassy's temporal conjunction with the Nasrid appeal lead to the conjecture that Mudejar envoys in the company of Granadan counterparts met not with Bayezit, but with Kemal Relson either-the Andalusia-n or the Maghriban coast (11). The Mudejars were certainly in touch with Ottoman corsairs by 1502 (12). Earlier contacts, while there was still some hope for the Nasrids, do not seem improbable. In any case, once Granada was conquered, the threat of an Ottoman invasión in relief of the Nasrids was removed, and with it the possibility of a large-scale Mudejar insurrection.
The initial years of Fernando's reign saw a continuation of Valencia's trade with Granada and the Maghrib, in which Mudejar merchants played an important role (13). (101 ACÁ: C 3665: 72r (23 April, 1487) : «E que axi matex havrien (the Muslim ajamas of the kingdom) elets e diputats dos moros per missatgers la hu de la morería de Xativa el altre de la de Paterna apellat Pacoret e aquells havrien tramesos al Thurch per notificarli la guerra que per nos se fa al dlt rey de Granada e la perdicio en que aquell ere si per lo dit Thurch no fos subvengut e ajudat, la qual ajuda havla esser tremetre ses gents en nostres regnes e signantment en Jo dit regne de Valencia en lo qual e en los altres li notificaven trobaria docents milia combatents moros qui de continent se levarían en sa ajuda e favor contra les crestians en deservey nostre e dan e destruccio deis crestians-.. vos... manam... que... reeban verídica informado redlgida en scrits de totes les damunt dites coses., e aquella closa segell orda e fe fahent nos trametan perqué vista puixam provenir sobre les dites coses degudament miganpant justicia en castich e punitio de les dits moros e morerias juxta los crims excessos e delicies que contra aquells e aquelles legitlmament se provaran».
(111 RACHEL ARIÉ, L'Espagne musulmane au temps des Nasrides (1232 ( -14921 (Paris, 1973 (19) This ¡ssuggested by the absenceof evidence of further «almugaver» activity. ACÁ: C 3649: 150v-151v (6 April, 1492), shows how well the kingdom's roads were controlled. Murcian Muslims could enter the kingdom only through the city of Orihuela. Thus, once the war had ended, the lord of the Valle de Ricote in Murcia asked that these travel restrictions be lifted.
(201 See note 13. ARV: C 707 also contains numerous examples of Mudejars travelling to the Maghrib on family business, such as 796v-797r (12 January, 1480), a license to Azmet Gallinayre of Oliva to travel to Tunis «per recaptar una herencia de hun parent seu que allí es mort»; or 914r-v (26 November, 1484), a license to Muhammad Perpir of Valencia tp go to Tunis «per veure hun jerma de aquell que te en la dita ciutat e per haver una herencia».
(21) Guiral, «Relations commerciales», pp. 107-111. However, Guiral'sarticle needs some correction. Her graph and tables, pp. 123-124, 131, suggest that there were not any Maghriban merchants in Valencia between 1493 and 1502, when, in fact, the registers ARV: B 1160 (e. g., 915v-916r), B 1161 (e. g., 15v-16r), and B 1162 {e. g., 123v-124r) contain safe-conducts permitting one year of residence in the kingdom to Maghriban merchants.
captives, some of whom, once ransomed, remained ¡n Valencia (22), provided Maghriban corsairs with a potential network oí spies and guides who could facilítate their ¡nfiltration of Valencian territory. Although Mudejar insurgence of this sort was by no means widespread, it was sufficiently vexatious to prompt the bailiff general to prohibit the ownership of fishing boats by Mudejars, so that they could not, under pretense of fishing, lead corsair galleys to Valencia's shores (23). Indeed, a Mudejar of Cocentaina was captured ¡n the company of 100 raiders from Oran (24). Even more striking was the information that a Muslim from Oliva was piloting a corsair fleet (25).
The absence of energetic royal action to curb such Mudejar activity can in part be explained with one of the arguments of Valencia's nobles against the conversión of the Mudejars in 1502. They maintained that Mudejars often advised Christians of the coming of corsairs (26). In 1503, while requesting that their Muslim vassals who had fled to the Maghrib be allowed to return to Valencia, certain lords emphasized that while their vassals were in África they did not capture Christians, rather they picked up information regarding «...the damage that the Moors from beyond would like to do (27)». Fernando, impressed, complied. Thus, the intelligence network between Muslims of opposite Mediterranean shores could work both ways, sometimes to the kingdom's benefit.
The exigencies of the decade-long crusade against Granada did not drastically alter Fernando's Mudejar policy. Strategies were not adapted for the eventuality of a Mudejar rising in Granada's favor, ñor were preventive measures taken beyond the investigation of rumors. The Mudejars were not significantly disturbed in their local economic and social pursuits. The only restrictions imposed were those limiting Mudejar travel to the regions of the kingdom closest to Granada and the passage of Muslims between Valencia and the Maghrib. So as not to curb Mudejar commercial activity any more than was absolutely necessary, the restrictions were relaxed in 1491, when victory seemed at hand (28). The probable opposition of the nobility, capable of con- trolling their own Muslim vassals, and the size of the Muslim population dissuaded Fernando from an excessively repressive policy that might have provoked a rebellion more quickly than the war itself.
In general, Fernando was confident that Christian dominance in Valencia would circumscribe Mudejar disloyalty to the few who intrigued with «almugavers» and corsairs. Given the weakness of the Nasrids before the combined power of Castile and Aragón, he could afford to be somewhat lax. It is significant that he becanne wary of the Mudejars only with respect to the Turks, the one Islamic power with substantial offensive capabilities. The king's confidence was well-founded, for not a Mudejar sword was unsheathed in defense of the beleaguered Nassrid sultanate.
Yet, it may be that the. Mudejars were more willing to empty their purses in support of the Nasrids. In 1487 it was reported that they had been sending large annual subsidies to the sultán since 1481. The fuqaha' (alfaquis), who were responsible for collecting the funds, were also leading their congregations in a prayer that beseeched God to exalt the sultán and to destroy Fernando and his hosts. The king, exasperated, ordered investigation and, if necessary, punishment (29). Although the documents are otherwise silent on this matter, it seems reasonable that, in lieu of military activity, Valencia's Muslim minority would have resorted to financial aid and prayer on behalf of that remnant of al-Andalus to which they were bound by religión and kinship (30). Indeed, their effort to make contact with the Turks on the Nasrids' behalf, if true, is another indication of their deep attachment to the Granadan sultanate, Still, beyond the inaudible sinking of Muslim hearts, the fall of Granada had no further reverberations in Mudejar Valencia. Taking into accout economic fluctuations -since the majority of the Mudejars travelled south for commerce-I have attributed the modérate decrease ¡n the number of licenses granted from 1485 through 1490 to a more stringent wartime policy. The sharp ¡ncrease ¡n 1491 perhaps reflects a reaction to the relaxation of the prevrous stringency. The continuing h¡gh level ¡n 1492 and 1493 can be attributed to post-war population shifts (Valencian Muslims retrieving relations for settlement ¡n Valencia, ransomed slaves already residing in Valencia returning to Granada for personal business, and Valencia's Muslims taking advantage of the opportunityjo visit Granadal, whereasthe marked decrease after 1495 perhaps reflects a gradual cordoning off of the former sultanate as an aid to Talavera's missionary efforts. The mere trickle from 1500 through 1502 was due to the revolts in the Alpujarras and the conversión of the Muslims of Granada, Murcia, and Castile.
Regarding the passage of Muslims between Valencia and the Maghrib, see note 21. Guiral's data, «Relations commerciales,» pp. 123-124, 131, is accurate for the years before 1493. ARV: C 707 shows that between 1484 and 1491 there were no licenses for travel to the Maghrib granted to Mudejars. There was a very sfight resumption of Mudejar travel in 1491: six licenses were granted, though three wereto Castilians and one to an Aragonese Mudejar. Unfortunately, there are no registers following ARV: C 707, which terminates in 1491 ..Given the fact that Maghriban merchants continued to come to Valencia throughout the 1490s, even during the years of the crusade against África, there is no reason why Mudejars should not have resümed their visits to the Maghrib, particularly when one considers that the majority of the Mudejars had been travelling to Tunis, with which city Fernando maintained consistent commercial relations.
(291 ACÁ: C 3665: 20v-21r (5 December, 1486): Fernando mentions the repon that the kingdom's morerías were sending the the sultán an annual subsidy of the valué of the skins of the animáis they had killed-ACÁ: C 3665: 72r (23 April, 1487) gives more detail: «Com siam ¡nformats que les aliantes de moros de aquex nostre regne de Valencia axi de realench com altres axi aliamalment com singularmente.de sis anys en ca havrien fets diversos socossos e subvencions de moltes quantitats de peccunia en grants sumes al rey de Granada...dipputant alfaquis e persones en cascuna aliama a plegar e rebre de cascun moro les dites subvencions e remetent les dites quantitats cascun any al dit rey perqué de aquells fos ajudaten sa deffensio e contra aquesta sancta empresa... encara los dits moróse los alfaquins de dites morones del dit temps de aquesta empresa en ca havrien ordenada una certa oratio e aquella fan de continuu en ses ores contenent en effecte que Deu exalte lo dit rey de Granada e que destruesta a nos e a totes nostres gents ab altres leges paraules de blasfemia que offenen les orelles.» See note 10 for Fernando's order that these rumors be investlgated. 
THE WARAGAINST ISLAM... / Meyerson
Fernando's post-war pollcy was an expression of hls belief ¡n the continuing viability of Mudejarism. Satisfied that Valencia had survived the shocks of the Granadan campaigns and the worst of the Ottoman threat without major incident, he encouraged the settlement of Granadan Muslims in a number of Valencian localities (31). Also, he permitted Muslim travel from Valencia to the new kingdom of Granada (32). Unfortunately, Fernando's relatively «liberal» policy was to be thwarted by the extremism of Isabel and Cardinal Cisneros.
The Mudejars' quiescence during the war years can be explained by their awareness of the realities of power which neither the distant progress of the Turks ñor the desultory raids of corsairs could change. The growth of Christian population in Valencia -approximately seventy per cent of the total by the mid-fifteenth century-and the increasing solidification of the structures of Christian authority brought home to the Mudejars the futility of rebellion (33). Moreover, the debility of the States of western Islam offered them little prospect of succor in the event of their rising (34). Only the Turks raised a faint glimmer of hope, but that quickly faded. Finally, more than tw.o centuries of life under Christian rule had inured them to their subject status. The conditions which had made the Mudejar bristle in the thirteenth century were accepted with greater equanimity in the fifteenth. This is not to suggest that the Mudejars were insensitive to the plight of their fellows. On the contrary, they displayed considerable commitment and sense of responsibility for their Muslim brethren, but they did so in áreas where they could be most effective. Rather than making war, they aided prisoners of war; and rather than vainly rebelling against their Christian lords, they acted on behalf of the victims of oppression. Mudejars helped Muslim prisoners break out of seigneurial jails (35); they spirited away from brothels Muslim women forced into a life of prostitution (36); and at times they violently resisted the efforts of royal officials to punish members of their communities (37). Most ¡mpressive was Mudejar assistance to slaves and captives, which seems to have been organized among the kingdom's morerías. Runaways were hidden in the morerías and were given boats for escape to África. Captives were ransomed and then either sent home or welcomed as permanent community members (38) (37) For example, ARV: C 148: 142v-143v (25 January, 1493): the amín and jurats of Matet resist the efforts of the governor's officials to seize two Muslims who had fled from the place of Gaibiel.
(38) One chapter of my doctoral dissertation will be devoted to the subject of Muslim slaves, both Valencian and foreign, and how the institution of slavery served, on the one hand, to define the inferior status of the Mudejar, and, on the other international Islamic community without rashly inciting the wrath of a king whose power they could not hope to challenge.
Despite all that has been said about the possibility of Mudejar disloyalty, one must not assume that all or even most of Fernando's Muslim subjects understood contemporary events in terms of Muslim-Christian confrontation, or that each one contemptated what might be done for the cause of Islam. Beneath all the crusading rhetoric lay the weighty determinant of self-interest. In a world where «realpolitik» was as ¡mpor-tant as ideology in the formation of alliances (39), where Granadan and Maghriban Muslims preferred to remain in Christian Valencia (40), and where Christians smuggled arms to Muslims and piloted their ships (41), ¡t is no great wonder that most Mudejars were reluctant to risk physical security in Valencia in support of a divisive Maghrib or a declining Granada. Even within Valencia Muslims expended as much energy in internecine quarreling and family feuding as they did in cooperative defiance of Christian authority (42). (Paris, 19661, and Abun-Nasr, op. cil., pp. 119-166 . That ¡t continued to be so is ¡ndicated by Fernando's alliance with the Mamluks against the Ottomans, and by the rerouteing of his African crusades toward Naples when it suited his ¡nterests. One ¡mportant change was the unión of Aragón and Castile, which rendered the Nasrids incapable of playing off one Christian kingdom against the other. (44) AMV: grumor-mongers, approving of Cisneros' methods and perhaps frightened that Muslim rebellion would spread to their kingdom, threatened to foment a wave of anti-Musüm violence. Fernando responded quickiy and placed all the moreríias of the kingdom under special royal safeguard. He declared the principie that «...our holy Catholic faith in the conversión of the infidels admits neither violence ñor any forcé but complete freedom and devotion». Anyone daring to say the contrary or to inflict physical or verbal abuse on the Muslims was to be punished (45). The king had to issue the same order for Catatonía (46}, and again for Valencia in 1502 (47).
In April, 1502, the nobles of Valencia informed Fernando that the Mudejars were gripped by two great fears: that they would be forced to convert or emigrate as were their coreligionists in Castile; and that the Inquisition was going to proceed against them for dissuading their fellows from baptism and for maintaining that Islam was a better religión (48). Having already admonished the Inquisitors, the nobles reminded Fernando that the Mudejars were the economic foundation of the kingdom without whom it would crumble. Already the distraught Muslims had stopped working and paying their rents. Instead, they were selling their property and hiding their goods in mountain caches. Those who had access to boats were leaving the kingdom (49), Worse still, the Mudejars were being driven to the brink of violence. The nobles warned that there were more than 22,000 households of Muslims who were well armed, had an intelligence network, and lived near impregnable mountain fastnesses. An imprudent move on the king's part could result in the deaths of Christians 145) ACÁ: C 3655: 34r-v (5 March, 150CH: «Anostra noticia es pervengut que algunes malivoles persones les quals no mogudes per zel de la honor de nostre Senyor Deu no de la religio christiana mas per algunes sinestres e graves intencions han seminat en Jos pobles de aquex Regne que seria e es nostra intencio e voluntat per forca reduyr a la sánela fe e religio christiana tots los moros -del dit Regne e encara sembrant altres coses preparades a grans scandals per moure los pobles contra los dits moros e cercar ocasions de alvolotar e levarse contra ells, los quals tement aqüestes novitats ... los dits moros se retrahen de no exir de ses poblacions ni de negociar ni comerciar segons accostumaven per no esser dampnificats en llurs persones e bens. Les quals coses son...tant contraríes a nostra intencio e voluntat com la nostra sancta fe catholica en la conversio deis infe.els no admeta violencia ni forca alguna sino summa libertat e devocio. E per co declaran! vos la intencio e voluntat nostra e volents que los qui tal dien sien castigats e punits e que los dits moros sien preservats.-.prenem e posam en nostra protectio e salvaguarda real totes les moreries...del dit nostre Regne e tots los poblats e habitants en aquelles...e que nengunes persones...no gosen ni presumesquen ño atienten de maltractar de fet ni de paraules ais dits moros,..ni parlar de la conversio de aquels ni ferlos dany en llurs persones ni bens...E si per algu o alguns ab osadía temeraria los sera feta o dita injuria alguna de feto de paraula...ultra les penes que per furs del dit nostre Regne de Valencia...incorreguen en totes aquelles qui son introduydes e disposades contra los qui rompen nostra salvaguarda real...» ACÁ: C3614: 53v-54r (26 March, 1500): Fernando assures the Infante Enrique that the rumors are false and that no action will be taken against the Mudejars. ¡46) ACÁ: C 3600: t76v-177r (30 September, 1501).
(47) ACÁ: C 3600: I91v-192r (20 February, 1502 )-Emilia Salvador, «Sobre la emigración mudejar a Berberia. El tránsito legal a través del puerto de Valencia durante el primer cuarto del siglo XVI,» Estudis, 4 (1975), pp. 61-63, transcribes this document, which is a reiteration of the order of 5 March, 1500.
(48) ARV: C 650: 240v-242r 112 April, 1502): «...dues coses que han granment en los ánimos deis dits moros augmentat la pahor que aquells temen la qual james han deposada per nengunes provisions que per vostra Alteza sien stades fetes. La primera la crida que per manament de vostra Alteza es stada publicada en aquex Regne de Casteila que los moros dins cert tempsse ha ¡en a fer crestianso haien a buydar lo Regne..-La segona quels esstat persuadit a donat a entendre jatsia falsament que los Reverents Inquisidors de la herética pravitat volen inquirir e procehir contra los moros de aquest Regne...La qual cosa ha causat en l'animo de aquells tan gran spant que tots stan fora de si matexes perqué dien que de apo negu dells sen pot scusar perqué publicament han tengut e teñen en lo present Regne ses mezquites e sos alfaquins los quals publicament los presiguen que la secta de Mahomat es millor que no la ley deis crestians. ,e que de acó. During these panic-filled months of 1 502 there carne to the -fore the Mudejars' contacts with Maghriban corsairs and their Ottoman allies (53). Muslím piratical activity noticeably increased in 1 502 and 1 503, as did the size and daring of their raiding parties (54). This was linked to peninsular events, since embittered Granadan Muslims had been filling the corsairs' ranks (55). It is clear that when corsairs set sail to plunder and terrorize Valencia's coasts they also had in mind assisting the kingdom's Muslims. Guided by Mudejar ¡ntelligence, the galleys arrived and picked up the Mudejars waiting on the shore (56).
It is significant that in this desperate situatton the Mudejars chose flight instead of armed rebellion. On the one hand, it reflects the Mudejars' sense of impotence before Christian power in Valencia. On the other hand, the willingness to abandon (50) ARV: C 650: 242v (1 2 April, 1 502): «...e ques preparen e provehexen be armes a que teñen ses inteliigencies ios huns ab los aítres per hon sospitam que no teñen neguna bona ¡ntencio.-.com h¡ haia pus de vint e dos milia cases de moros e que teñen moltes belles e forts places vent quels sia feta alguna forca o violencia en compellirlos a fer crestians via directa o indirecta no fagan algún moviment en aquest Regne que seria procurar algún irreparable dan. Car o segutnt sen morís de crestians o destruccio de llurs o morts deis moros o destruccio de sos benes en totes maneres es dan pera aquest Regne irreparable.
(51) ARV: C 650: 247v-248r (24 May, 1502): «Car no obstant ques diga en la Real provisio que los moros no puguen desvasalíar deis senyors de qui son vasalls e ferse vasalls de altres ni puguen vendré los bens sehents e encara mobles que teñen ne per lo semblant puixen teñir barques ni altres fustes pera pexcar ni entrar en la mar sots pena de cativs e altres penes. Encara queaquests remeys pareguen pnma fas..-profitosos e mostrants portar repos alsdits moros empero nosaltres qui tenim clara noticia deis recéis a temors que los dits moros teñen., .entenem que los dits remeys . .portarien.augment deis recéis que ios dits moros teñen...» (52) ARV: C 650: 251r-252v (6 July, 1502): «...a les portes de les mezquites deis dits lochs han afigit certs cartells ab ios quals citen e manen a les aljames e alamms veíls e noveíls deis dits lochs que per-tot lo propasai mes de Juny sien e compareguen en la present ciutat...per respondre davant la...Senyora Reyna (of Sicily, Fernando's lieutenant general in the kingdom) a qualsevol demandes axi civils com crimináis..-per raho de haver recepta!.e amagat catius...Lo que ha fet grandissima operado en totes los poblacios deis dits moros perqué los dits moros dien que aquest modo e forma de procehir nos fa sino a fi de voier los incudir temors dient que las aljamas han delinquit e que per rembre la punicio del crim quels es imposat los sera forcat o de ferse crestians o buydar los Regne...tan gran es la temor de aquells que los dits cartells hun día de dijous foren afigits a les portes de la mezquita de hun lloch appellat Altea terme de Calp que es del noble Don Palafoix de Rebolledo e lo.disapte apres seguent sen anaren lots los vasalls e habitants en lo dit ioch moros los quals eren cent setanta...los quals sen son anats en dues fustes molt poques de Turchs...En apres de la fuyla de aquells se son fogits pus de vint e cinch vasalls de la baronia de Callosa...» (53) That the Turks were also involved is indicated in note 52 -«fustes molt poques de Turchs» -and ¡n the reports received by the jurats of Valencia from Ibiza -AMV: g 3 34: 4v (3 June, 1502), 10v-l 1r (16 July, 1502), and ARV: C 650: 253r-v (18 July, 15021-which mention «fustes de Turchs», as well as «fustes de moros» gathering in Bougie and Algiers.
(54) AMV: g 3 33: 290v-291r (1 May, 1502): in response to the increased piratical activity, the capital and the other coastal towns of the kingdom establish a warning system utilizing smoke signáis to advise of the enemy's approach and the size of his torces. AMV: g 3 34: I71r-173r (30 August, 1503): Cullera is sacked by a forcé of more than 600 corsairs and more than 200 Christian captives are taken. There were other attacks of lesser dimensión, for exampíe, ARV: C 311: 254v-255r (6 June, 1502): the town of Almoradi defends itself against more than 100 raiders from Oran and Tlemsen (55) Fernand Braudel, «Les Espagnols et l'Afrique du Nord de 1492 a 1577,» Revue Afrícaine, 69 (1928), pp. 203-208, sug- gets that the crusade against África had as one of its motives the eiimination of the activities of Maghriban corsairs, among whom the refugees from Granada proved to be Spain's bitterest enemies. ARV: B 195: 65r-v (30 April, 1502) : the testimony of a Granadan Muslim who became a corsair in Oran after residing in Paterna for some years.
i56) AMV: g 3 34: 2v (27 May, 1502): «...fustes de moros venen a la vora de la mar al stany de Corbera e fan fochs...es gran dan de tota la costa per quant los moros de la costa se creu ques recullen e sen van en les dites fustes...» AMV. g 3 34: 11r (16 July, 1 502): «...de continu arriben fustes de moros e ab la ¡ntelligencia que teñen de alguns moros del present regne que nos partexen de les marines sen parten moEts moros de la Valí d'Alfandech e del Ioch de Piles..» ARV: C 650: 253r-v (18 July, 1502)''. regarding the report that eighteen Maghriban and Turkish galleys were preparing to sail for Vaíencia, the nobles note, «...los moros de aquest Regne stan tant comoguts per llur temor de esser forcats de ferse crestians que tots se lexaron anar com a desesperáis per recullirse en dites fustes, Maiorment que en aquest Regne es lo Valí de Guadales! e altres lochs per hon los moros poden arribar a mar sens empach algu e que se porien recullir co que teñen ells be percebut e practica!.» their homes and possessions shows that for the Mudejars the freedom to practice Islam outweighed all other considerations. When forced to convert in 1 525, a number of Mudejars would resort to armed resistance (57). When, in 1503, Fernando restored calm and assured all parties in the Corts of Barcelona that Islam would continué to be sanctioned by royal authority, a number of Mudejars returned home from the Maghrib (58). As long asthey could practice Islam, Vaiencia's Muslims preferred to do so in Valencia.
In conclusión, the international clash between Christianity and Islam did not nave ¡n Valencia an impa.ct sufficient to unravel the resilient fabric of Muslim-Christian «con-vivencia». The Mudejars did not express their identification with Islam by rebelling against their crusading king; ñor did that king harshly oppress his Muslim subjects while warring with Islamic states. The occasional Mudejar collusion with Muslim enemies was borne as a customary feature of frontier life, an insignificant annoyance in comparison with the economic benefits accruing from the Mudejar presence. A key factor in explaining why Vaiencia's Christians and Muslims did not rise up in violence against each other in response to the promotion of crusade is that for them ChristianMuslim conflict, on either the local or the international scale, was not anything new. Ever-present in the social formula of «convivencia» itself was the element of ideological antagonism, which was either mitigated or aggravated by economic and social factors. Indeed, economic and social distress, the result of forces external to the fundamental religious difference, was usually most responsible for the eruption of violence (59) . More novel than war with Islam was the harnessing of Aragón to the Castilian juggemaut, which, while it allowed for the final conquest of Granada, also unleashed forces within Valencia that threatened its tradition of Mudejarism. Although the unión of the two Crowns set the stage for Spain's imperial achievements, it redirected the destinies of its constituent societies in sometimes tragic ways. 
